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religious controversy on local neighborhoods. Houlbrooke and Dur- 
ston express interest in social experience but make no persuasive argu- 
ment about the political content of social experience or its significance 
in disputes over religious authority. The fundamental problem there- 
fore remains the absence of an interpretive framework to unite dispa- 
rate historiographical and research questions in a systematic approach 
to early modern English society. The books under review demonstrate 
the process whereby unconscious modes of classification and collec- 
tive representation in a historical community may inform even the best 
critical intentions to reproduce the conventional categories of thought, 
in this case, the categories of religion, politics, and society. I have 
attempted both to confront the books on their own terms and to suggest 
the limitations of those terms. A more coherent social history, sensi- 
tive to religious symbolism and ceremony in early modern conceptions 
of politics and society, requires new maps and further exploration. We 
cannot just stick the maps of the old field system together and connect 
the lines. 
DAN BEAVER 
Pennsylvania State University 
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The study of British politics after the First World War has been 
much influenced by the social and political changes following the Sec- 
ond. Those writing in anticipation or appreciation of social security or 
full employment after 1945 have tended to dwell on the inadequacies 
of "reconstruction" after 1918;1 alternatively, those searching for the 
For this view, see R. H. Tawney's classic article, "The Abolition of Economic 
Controls," Economic History Review 13 (1943): 1-30; also Paul Johnson, Land Fit for 
Heroes: The Planning of British Reconstruction, 1916-1919 (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1968); Paul Addison, The Road to 1945 (London: Cape, 1975). 
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roots of the postwar consensus have tended to treat politics largely as 
an exercise in class conciliation or the mediation of interests.2 Maurice 
Cowling's example notwithstanding,3 "high political" accounts- 
which treat political activity as (in the words of one of the authors 
reviewed here) "a largely autonomous activity with its own complex 
priorities, procedures, and languages"4-have been thin on the 
ground. This past year, however, has seen the publication of two im- 
portant and awaited volumes that apply either a convinced (William- 
son) or a partial (Turner) "high political" approach to administrations 
usually studied for their impact on economic and social policy. These 
two books thus demonstrate in a fairly stark fashion what this approach 
can offer us-and what it cannot. 
The terms of the debate over the competence of the second La- 
bour government were set twenty-five years ago by Robert Skidelsky's 
Politicians and the Slump, which, however battle scarred, is still the 
target against which newer studies take aim. For Skidelsky, writing in 
the heyday of Keynesianism, the failure of the second Labour govern- 
ment was unquestionably a failure of policy, and specifically of unem- 
ployment policy. The Labour government, he points out, took office 
pledged to do something about unemployment, and in David Lloyd 
George's public works plans, Oswald Mosley's proposals, and John 
Maynard Keynes's contributions to the Macmillan committee and the 
Economic Advisory Council, they had perfectly plausible blueprints 
for action. They were overtaken not only by economic crisis but by 
their own political and intellectual incapacity, by the fact that they 
were unable to envisage any middle ground between Socialist utopia 
and the "Treasury view." The former being manifestly out of reach, 
they spent their time in office struggling to balance the budget and 
defend the gold standard while unemployment figures climbed from 
1.5 million to double that two years later.5 
This account has been undergoing steady revision and correction 
for years, a process begun when Ross McKibbin questioned the degree 
to which any coherent "Keynesian" alternative really existed in 1930 
and continued by studies that describe the "Keynesian revolution" as 
a more gradual process or that give more realistic estimates of the 
2 Most extremely-and controversially-in Keith Middlemas, Politics in Industrial 
Society: The Experience of the British System since 1911 (London: Andr6 Deutsch, 
1979). 
3 Maurice Cowling, The Impact of Labour, 1920-1924: The Beginning of Modern 
British Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971). 
4Williamson, National Crisis, p. 13. 
5 Robert Skidelsky, Politicians and the Slump: The Labour Government of 1929- 
1931 (London: Macmillan, 1967). 
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likely outcome of even the most interventionist employment propos- 
als.6 Philip Williamson's ambitious study of political realignment in 
this period shares this more moderate assessment of the government's 
policy record, but his major intent is to dispute the claim that the fate 
of the second Labour government was determined primarily by their 
performance in the area of policymaking anyway. His conclusion puts 
it like this: "Any other government confronted by the economic reces- 
sion from 1929 would have suffered enormous difficulties and, in terms 
of its previous programmes and pledges, would almost certainly have 
'failed.' But the Labour government suffered more than another might 
have done because it lacked resourcefulness and flexibility not just in 
its ideas but in its words. Unlike later Labour governments, including 
those of 1945-51, it allowed itself insufficiently plausible explanations 
for major setbacks. It could not absorb policy defeats. Its failure was 
not simply in policy, but in politics."7 Political inflexibility and lack of 
finesse were thus a major reason for Labour's weakness, although 
chance and contingency were also in part to blame. Hampered from 
the outset by minority status and unanticipated economic and imperial 
crises, the government was forced into an ever-close reliance on the 
demanding Lloyd George, now back at the head of a reunited Liberal 
Party and himself struggling to control dissenters in his ranks. 
Williamson argues that it is in this context of party instability- 
and not, as Skidelsky saw it, of policy failure-that we can understand 
Labour's fall and the formation of the National Government. And it 
is here that his work is especially subtle and innovative. Other histori- 
ans-and especially Stuart Ball-have stressed the degree of division 
within all parties during 1930 and have noted the spread of calls for 
greater cross-party cooperation or even a "national government," al- 
though Ball points out that Baldwin had regained control of his party 
by 1931.8 Williamson does not dispute this chronology; he does, how- 
ever, insist that this prior discussion was more extensive than previous 
historians have recognized and remained important even after it was 
supposedly silenced. As he points out, in late July 1931, when the 
May committee recommended drastic social spending cuts and sterling 
balances plummeted, talk of "national government" quickly resur- 
6Ross McKibbin, "The Economic Policy of the Second Labour Government, 
1929-31," Past and Present, no. 68 (1975), pp. 95-123; Peter Clarke, The Keynesian 
Revolution in the Making, 1924-1936 (Oxford: Clarendon, 1988). W. R. Garside, in 
summarizing this debate, offers the cautious conclusion that "Keynesian" measures 
could have produced results in the thirties, if not necessarily on the scale that Lloyd 
George would have wanted: "It is still not too late to urge caution in accepting unre- 
servedly the view that Keynesian pump priming would have been of very limited value" 
(Garside, British Unemployment, 1919-1939 [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1990], p. 378). Many economic historians would dispute this view. 
7 Williamson, National Crisis, p. 526. 
8 Stuart Ball, Baldwin and the Conservative Party: The Crisis of 1929-1931 (New 
Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1988). 
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faced, testifying "to the extent to which private discussion, public 
advocacy, and rumour during late 1930 had created an expectation that 
if an emergency were to occur a.coalition might be desirable or else 
difficult to avoid."9 
The process by which this revived rhetoric was transformed into 
reality was complicated, and Williamson is at pains here-as he has 
been in his articles-to deny that either the bankers or the king were 
chiefly responsible for the National Government's creation. This argu- 
ment is sustained by a narrative that does indeed demonstrate that key 
decisions remained in politicians' hands but that also requires us to 
accept that they shared Williamson's extremely narrow conception 
of what was politically imaginable or constitutionally proper. Thus, 
Williamson demolishes the old charge of the "bankers' ramp" by ar- 
guing that the bankers' advice, however "conventional," was "readily 
accepted by all politicians directly concerned" ;1 less convincingly, he 
absolves the king of any real influence with the rather legalistic argu- 
ment that "to conclude that the King was chiefly responsible for the 
outcome is to misconceive the true relationship between the Crown 
and party politics. The King could not command."" He rightly 
stresses that it was tripartite consultation among party leaders, and 
not pressure from bankers, that led unemployment benefit cuts to be 
defined as the basis for a restoration of "confidence"; ultimately, a 
similarly "national" collaboration came to be seen as the best way 
of sharing out the political responsibility. Williamson thus sees the 
formation of the National Government as a result of political calcula- 
tion rather than policy failure, stressing that Stanley Baldwin and Nev- 
ille Chamberlain never lost their concern to safeguard party interest 
while the politicians most interested in policy rather than party-such 
as Winston Churchill and Lloyd George-continued to be excluded 
from its ranks.'2 
Williamson's revisionist account adds immeasurably to our under- 
standing of the crucial transitional years of the second Labour govern- 
ment. In stressing the importance of the Liberal revival to the instabil- 
ity of 1930 and the reconfiguration of 1931, Williamson provides a 
realistic portrait of the complexities of party control and governance 
9 Williamson, National Crisis, p. 274. 
10Ibid., p. 292; also Philip Williamson, "A 'Bankers' Ramp'? Financiers and the 
British Political Crisis of August 1931," English Historical Review 99 (1984): 770-806. 11 Williamson, National Crisis, p. 335. His arguments for the overriding importance 
of the politicians' responses are summarized succinctly in his response to Vernon Bogda- 
nor's article on 1931: Philip Williamson, "1931 Revisited: The Political Realities," Twen- 
tieth Century British History 2, no. 3 (1991): 328-38. 
12 He points out, for example, that Chamberlain and Baldwin pressed for a quick 
election even though such a course of action would worsen pressure on the pound-"an 
outstanding instance of 'politics' prevailing against 'policy'" (Williamson, National Cri- 
sis, p. 412). 
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during a hung parliament and convincingly postdates by eight years a 
process of two-party polarization Maurice Cowling saw to be "com- 
plete" by 1924.13 Like Cowling, however, Williamson is open to the 
charge that, by dealing only superficially with constituency-level poli- 
tics, he has employed a method more appropriate to the period before 
the Second Reform Act than to the era of mass party organizations 
and universal suffrage.14 Here, however, Williamson's book can be 
complemented by Andrew Thorpe's recent study of the election of 
1931, a book based on a substantial slice of the manuscript collections 
Williamson consulted but supplemented by newspaper and constit- 
uency records. Thorpe also sees 1931 not only as a sharp defeat for 
Labour but also as a fundamental realignment of the political land- 
scape. Labour's fine showing in 1929 (winning 287 seats compared to 
260 for the Conservatives and fifty-nine for the Liberals) had been 
made possible by three-cornered fights in almost every constituency; 
the fact that the Party faced a straight fight against the National Gov- 
ernment in most constituencies in 1931 meant that it would have had 
to increase its poll dramatically in order to win anywhere near the 
same number of seats. Instead, Labour's share of the vote declined 
from 38 percent to 29 percent (compared to a growth from 38 percent 
to 55 percent for the Conservatives), a result that left the Party with 
a paltry forty-six members, facing 554 supporters of the National Gov- 
ernment, 470 of them Conservatives. By categorizing constituencies 
by class and economic base, Thorpe shows the extent to which this 
decline operated even in previously safe seats; he does not, however, 
discuss voting patterns by sex-something of a drawback given the 
recent evidence of disproportionately high levels of support for the 
Conservatives among women voters.15 
Thorpe sees this result as a reasonable verdict on the performance 
of the Labour government and is as merciless in his dismissal of some 
classic excuses for Labour's poor result as Williamson is in his destruc- 
tion of the myth of the "bankers' ramp." He convincingly demolishes 
the argument that the election was a nefarious plot to foist protection 
on a bewildered public by pointing out that Conservatives had every 
expectation of winning an election before the August crisis and made 
no effort to disguise their protectionist plans. Less satisfying are his 
conclusions about the importance of the press: while he does show 
that the press was "biased" and "scurrilous" across the political spec- 
trum, his own evidence of the extent of Tory press dominance renders 
his opinion that the press probably mattered only in a few marginal 
13 Cowling, p. 414 
14 Stuart Ball makes this critique of the application of a "high political" approach 
to the twentieth century in Baldwin and the Conservative Party, p. xiv. 
15 For the Conservatives' appeal to women in the twenties, see Martin Pugh, The 
Tories and the People, 1880-1935 (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1985), pp. 177-83; John 
Ramsden, The Age of Balfour and Baldwin, 1902-1940 (London: Longman, 1978), esp. 
chap. 11. 
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seats rather hard to evaluate.'6 His tendency to see the election as a 
verdict on the Labour Party in particular-rather than simply a ner- 
vous rush toward stability-also sits uncomfortably with his finding 
that the independent Liberals, led by Herbert Samuel during Lloyd 
George's illness, suffered even more than Labour in three-cornered 
fights.17 Yet it was Labour, and not the Liberals, that needed to rise 
to the challenge of 1931, and here, as Thorpe insists, they utterly 
failed. Labour had trouble defending itself because its past action was 
inglorious, its future plans implausible, and its credibility drastically 
weakened during the campaign, as the "National Labour" leaders re- 
vealed the extent to which their ex-colleagues in the late cabinet had 
been committed to unemployment benefit cuts-a fact that fully three- 
quarters of Conservative candidates mentioned in their election ad- 
dresses. 
Thorpe's volume is an important complement to Williamson's 
study, showing the degree to which Ramsay MacDonald's actions were 
accepted beyond the rarified realm of Parliament. Yet Williamson's 
account poses a second problem, especially to the historian of social 
policy. Williamson does have serious claims to make in this area: as 
he reiterated in the recent controversy in Twentieth Century British 
History, the book is "concerned as much with policy as with poli- 
tics,"18 intended, I take it, to provide a more complete understanding 
of the choices made on both levels. Yet policy choices are treated in 
this account primarily as tools in the struggle for political advantage; 
the framework that determined the range of choice-itself a political 
construct-is never seriously investigated. This is a particular weak- 
ness for a study of 1931, when the range of choices available to the 
government was conceived very narrowly. Williamson shows the de- 
gree to which Labour's room for maneuver was limited by the Party's 
acceptance of three assumptions: that the gold standard and balanced 
budgets were a premise for responsible politics, that the unemploy- 
ment insurance system should be financed through the agreed balance 
of contributions and not require Treasury subsidies (whatever the state 
of the economy), and that the government should consult other parties 
during crises before extraparliamentary "interests." Yet he never re- 
ally explains how these assumptions came to be established, con- 
tenting himself with pointing out that the parameters of "sound fi- 
nance" were accepted almost across the political spectrum.19 
In part, this lacuna is a result of his time frame, which makes far 
6 Thorpe, pp. 210-11. 17 Ibid., p. 263. 18 Williamson, "1931 Revisited," pp. 329 ff. 
19 "Certainly the Bank had contributed over many years to a political culture which, 
by prescribing certain conceptions of 'sound finance', imposed constraints upon what 
governments thought they could do. But then so had civil servants, businessmen and 
many politicians, Labour as well as Conservative and Liberal" (Williamson, National 
Crisis, p. 292). 
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more sense for a study of party politics than of the evolution of policy. 
By beginning his study with the Liberal revival of 1926,20 Williamson 
excludes the years in which both economic policy and the nature of 
the constitution were more contested. The policy framework he takes 
as given was neither so stable nor so accepted in the years immediately 
after the war-a period that all the political leaders of 1929-31 remem- 
bered well and that was much on their minds. Given Williamson's own 
compelling evidence of the ways in which the evocation of an analogy 
with the war underlay the rhetorical construction of 1931 as a "national 
crisis," it is something of a problem that the book never tells us what 
it was about these earlier political alliances and policy choices that 
aroused such fear and fascination. I return to this question briefly 
below, but we can begin to understand some of these links by looking 
at John Turner's dissection of the politics of Lloyd George's wartime 
coalition. 
II 
In tackling the Lloyd George coalition, Turner, like Williamson, 
has written a political history of an administration more often studied 
for its influence on economic, social, and industrial relations.21 In doing 
so, he is following up his own insight in an important essay on the 
organization of wartime government published some ten years ago. 
There, he offered a pertinent critique of a historiography that had 
tended to differentiate between the two wartime coalitions by attribut- 
ing political skill to Herbert Asquith and administrative skill to Lloyd 
George-a formulation, he argued, that obscured real administrative 
continuities and underestimated the extent to which Lloyd George's 
policy successes were premised on parliamentary and political flexibil- 
ity. "The essential difference between Lloyd Georgian and Asquithian 
Cabinet government," he wrote, "was political, not administrative: 
Lloyd George, unlike Asquith, was able to rid himself of significant 
internal opposition."22 
Turner's massive British Politics and the Great War builds on but 
also qualifies this insight, offering in the process something of a model 
for the judicious and partial use of a "high political" approach. Any 
competent prosecution of the war, he shows, depended on the govern- 
20 Williamson does argue for the unity of his period in terms of financial and trade 
policy and of Indian constitutional reform as well, but admits that the Liberal Party 
provides "in some senses the crucial" source of coherence (National Crisis, pp. 14-15). 
21 This literature is vast, and Turner is well up on it; indeed, his chapter on "Capital 
and Labour" provides a good summary of the current state of research. See also the 
valuable collection of essays edited by Kathleen Burk, War and the State: The Transfor- 
mation of British Government, 1914-1919 (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1982). 
22 John Turner, "Cabinets, Committees and Secretariats: the Higher Direction of 
War," in Burk, ed., p. 78. 
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ment's ability to command the consent or at least the tolerance of all 
parties in the Commons: this is the justification for a close focus on 
Cabinet-level negotiations and for the choice of a chronological narra- 
tive style. Where Turner parts company with "high political" assump- 
tions, however, is in his emphasis on the extent to which a concern 
for the "national interest" (as politicians construed it), and not simply 
the struggle for short-term personal and party advantage, drove politi- 
cal events. Certainly, as Turner shows, personal and party consider- 
ations were never far from politicians' minds-and particularly from 
the mind of Asquith, who clung to the Liberal leadership while engag- 
ing in "unpredictable and often petulant ventures into opposition," 
behavior that further weakened the postwar position of the Liberals.23 
But the Coalition leaders came together in December of 1916 and (still 
more) stayed together through 1917 and 1918 because they felt initially 
that the prosecution of the war and later that the stability of the country 
would be endangered by normal political rivalries. Turner is particu- 
larly good at detailing the process by which the idea and mission of 
the Coalition was elaborated. After the wave of unofficial strikes dur- 
ing May 1917, he points out, Coalition leaders were forced "to come 
to terms with the possibility of revolutionary change, and to set their 
minds to containing it at the same time as merely winning the struggle 
with the Central Powers";24 with the German spring offensive of 1918, 
even the Tory backbenchers accepted the need to perpetuate the Coali- 
tion into peacetime.25 
Turner outlines the Coalition's response to this perceived extra- 
parliamentary challenge in two final, thematic chapters on the Coupon 
election and on relations between capital and labor-chapters which 
are by far the most compelling portions of the book. Through a statisti- 
cal study and a comparison with the election of 1922, Turner demon- 
strates that the 1918 election was "a deliberate and largely successful 
effort to hold back the advance of the Labour Party."26 A number of 
factors contributed to that success-the choice of an early polling date, 
which helped to ensure the low soldiers' poll; an apathetic electorate as 
yet unaware of the problems of the peace; and a high vote among 
newly enfranchised women-a factor that favored the Conservatives 
not only because of a hard-to-measure "gender gap" but also because 
the restrictive female franchise resulted in a female electorate more 
middle-class than the population as a whole. 
The discussion of the Coalition's industrial policies is even more 
important since for all his attention to day-to-day crisis management 
and the military direction of the war, Turner clearly sees his study as 
23 Turner, British Politics, p. 442. 24 Ibid., p. 191. 
25 Ibid., p. 304. 26 Ibid., p. 434. 
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part of the ongoing historiographical inquiry into the impact of the war 
on the scope and uses of state power. The appropriate limits of state 
intervention was the most pressing political question of the prewar 
period, Turner argues, and one of the main differences between the 
Asquith and Lloyd George coalitions was their different views on this 
question. Mediation of industrial disputes, resorted to ad hoc under 
Asquith, became part of a strategy of counterrevolution under Lloyd 
George, whose Coalition also tried systematically to incorporate busi- 
ness interests and trade unions as the agents (if not the makers) of 
policy.27 Yet Turner insists that such "incorporation" did not resemble 
"corporatism": since politicians always retained the initiative, and 
both capital and labor remained divided, incorporation "led in practice 
to robust conflict as much as to consensus."28 The irony, he concludes, 
is that the Lloyd George coalition created both the case for a more 
extensive use of state power and the reaction against that agenda-a 
convincing argument in line with recent revisionist work on industrial 
policy and with McKibbin's insightful essay exploring the political 
appeal of deflationary politics in the period between the wars.29 
What is not convincing is the elaboration of this argument within 
the context (once again) of a "high political" periodization, which 
forces Turner to encapsulate his arguments about industrial relations 
and economic management within a framework determined by election 
dates. Turner does to some extent recognize this problem by trans- 
gressing the boundary of 1918 in his final chapters, but he does not go 
nearly far enough in this respect, leaving the impression that the poli- 
tics of the postwar Coalition were set by the end of the war-a view 
that overlooks the extent to which political leaders adjusted their strat- 
egies in the face of the social unrest of 1919. After all, as Turner 
himself argues, the Conservatives decided to continue with Lloyd 
George precisely because they expected a serious and not entirely 
predictable threat to stability after 1918; if their decision gave the 
Coalition the parliamentary position from which to "pacify" the coun- 
try it could hardly ensure that this "pacification" would be successful. 
Recent historians might insist that Labour was fearsomely "constitu- 
tional" in 1918-19 and any threat from "the country" much exagger- 
ated,30 but the merest glance at Cabinet records shows that many 
27 For an excellent study of how such "incorporation" worked in practice, see Gerry 
R. Rubin, War, Law and Labour: The Munitions Acts, State Regulation and the Unions, 
1915-1921 (Oxford: Clarendon, 1987). 28 Turner, British Politics, p. 369. 
29See, esp. Rodney Lowe, "The Ministry of Labour, 1916-19: A Still, Small 
Voice?" in Burk, ed., pp. 108-34; Ross McKibbin, "Class and Conventional Wisdom: 
The Conservative Party and the 'Public' in Inter-war Britain," in his The Ideologies of 
Class: Social Relations in Britain, 1880-1950 (Oxford: Clarendon, 1990), pp. 259-93. 
30 Ross McKibbin emphasizes just how deeply constitutional Labour really was in 
1918; see The Evolution of the Labour Party, 1910-1924 (Oxford: Clarendon, 1974), 
esp. p. 99. 
330 
This content downloaded from 128.59.62.83 on Fri, 15 Nov 2013 06:27:53 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Conservative leaders held no such views: they faced the task of de- 
mobilizing some three million men and converting the economy to 
peacetime production with the vision not of Clynes and Henderson 
but of strikes, mutinies, and Moscow in their minds.31 The depth of 
these fears meant that electoral success did not spell the end of statist 
initiatives: as Kenneth Morgan has shown, the battle between support- 
ers of intervention and advocates of retrenchment continued to rage 
during the postwar Coalition,32 its outcome only decided with the re- 
version to a policy of "dear money" in April of 1920 and the ensuing 
slump of 1920-21.33 Turner shows us the process by which party lead- 
ers were drawn to construct a Party of Order poised to pursue a strat- 
egy of stabilization but then-frustratingly-breaks off his narrative 
with the challenges and consequences of that strategy unexplored. It 
may seem ungrateful to argue that he should have done more- 
especially when what he does do is so well done-but unless one is 
interested (as Maurice Cowling was) in political machinations for their 
own sake and is willing simply to leave questions of policy to one side, 
the cost of adopting a "high political" periodization seems high. 
III 
My purpose in juxtaposing these two works is to return the study 
of policy to a slightly broader time frame, a context that allows us to 
see the extent to which the handling of the "national crisis" of 1931 
was conditioned by the legacies of the immediate postwar period. Polit- 
ical responses to both "crises" were part of an effort at stabilization 
that absorbed most politicians (and not only in Britain) after the shocks 
of the World War, but that took a very different form under Lloyd 
George than it did under Baldwin or MacDonald. In its effort at pacifi- 
cation, the Coalition continued to wield state power in ways deeply 
31 Maurice Cowling implicitly recognized the extent of these fears when he took the 
precaution of dating his own "high political" study from 1920 (when Labour was clearly 
"constitutional") rather than from 1918, since "what [the Labour leaders] would have 
done if economic collapse had occurred in 1918 instead of 1920 is difficult to know" 
(Cowling [n. 3 above], p. 40). Of course, this formulation makes the classic "high 
political" mistake of treating this economic context as given-ignoring the fact that the 
Coalition deliberately followed inflationary policies in the immediate postwar period in 
order to minimize unrest and keep Labour "constitutional." 
32 Kenneth O. Morgan, Consensus and Disunity: The Lloyd George Coalition, 1918- 
1922 (Oxford: Clarendon, 1979). 
33 The actual magnitude of the post-war slump is hard to measure, given the inflated 
state of the economy in 1919-20, but Derek Aldcroft suggests that it was far more 
serious than the 1929-32 slump. His figures show manufacturing production falling over 
the course of 1920-21 by 22 percent, gross domestic product by 12 percent, and employ- 
ment by over 14 percent-compared with 10 percent, 4.8 percent, and 4.7 percent, 
respectively, for the years 1929-32. Derek Aldcroft, The Inter-war Economy: Britain, 
1919-1939 (London: B. T. Batsford, 1970), p. 34. 
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out of keeping with prewar assumptions, deliberately using inflationary 
financial policy, a massive extension of unemployment benefits (even 
to those who had not qualified or had exhausted their eligibility), and 
overt interference in industrial relations, in order to facilitate demobili- 
zation and ease unrest.34 Obviously, such policies-however success- 
ful-were tolerable to Conservative backbenchers only so long as 
there was a credible threat to public order; when deflation and unem- 
ployment defused that threat, they jettisoned Lloyd George to come 
to a "tacit agreement" with Labour-a realignment based not only 
on a compatibility between Baldwin and MacDonald's calculations of 
political advantage35 but also on a degree of convergence at the level 
of policy. As a range of policy studies have demonstrated, both the 
Conservatives and Labour increasingly accepted a framework for pol- 
icy making that restricted the scope of what a "responsible" govern- 
ment could do. Both parties agreed that financial policy should be 
made "knave proof," that is, subject to the impartial discipline of 
the gold standard and balanced budgets;36 further, despite their very 
different objectives in social policy, at least some sections of the La- 
bour party did come to accept that the insurance system should be 
freed from reliance on Treasury loans and made less subject to 
"abuse"-a position that made it hard for the Party to tolerate the 
levels of borrowing resorted to throughout 1930 and 1931.37 Finally, 
34 On the Coalition's postponement of the return to "dear money," see Susan How- 
son, "The Origins of Dear Money, 1919-20," Economic History Review, 2d ser., 27, 
no. 1 (1974): 88-107; for a succinct summary of the government's hurried extension of 
the soldiers' out-of-work donation to civilians and their vast expansion of unemployment 
insurance, see Garside, British Unemployment (n. 6 above), pp. 34-43. Note also minis- 
ters' continued efforts to conciliate trade union leaders, especially during 1919, when 
they believed, as Bonar Law put it in Cabinet, that "the Trade Union organisation was 
the only thing between us and anarchy" (Public Record Office, Cab. 23/9, War Cabinet 
525 [February 4, 1919], p. 4). 35 Cowling points out that political stability after 1924 was based on Baldwin's under- 
standing that MacDonald would promise "constitutionality" if allowed to supplant As- 
quith and Lloyd George as the main opposition leader. This realignment was built around 
"a tension of connivance between MacDonald, who was compelled by his situation to 
mean no harm, and Baldwin, whose situation compelled him to feel confident that no 
harm would be done" (Cowling, p. 429; see also pp. 380-81). Cowling also notes Bald- 
win's willingness to accommodate and win back Lloyd George's allies, but his absolute 
unwillingness to negotiate with the Liberal Party or Lloyd George himself (pp. 382-405, 
411). 
36The phrase is P. J. Grigg's, private secretary to Snowden in 1929, quoted in 
National Crisis, p. 74. James Cronin's recent book makes clear the extent to which 
Labour's financial policies moved in a conservative direction in the twenties: while the 
Party continued to support progressive tax policies, they abandoned the capital levy 
and remained firmly committed to debt reduction and the defense of gold. James Cronin, 
The Politics of State Expansion: War, State, and Society in Twentieth-Century Britain 
(London: Routledge, 1991), esp. chap. 7. 37 On unemployment policy in the twenties, see especially Alan Deacon, "Conces- 
sion and Coercion: The Politics of Unemployment Insurance in the Twenties," in Essays 
in Labour History, 1918-1939, ed. Asa Briggs and John Saville (London: Croom Helm, 
1977), pp. 9-35. 
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substantial sections of both parties had reason to dislike any hint of 
corporatism and to support efforts to make Parliamentary politics into 
that "relatively autonomous" realm that Williamson sees it to be. It 
was the Conservatives who went furthest in attempting to craft a defi- 
nition of citizenship that extended the civil rights of individuals (espe- 
cially women) while simultaneously treating interest group politics as 
fundamentally antithetical to Parliamentary sovereignty.38 But some 
within the Labour movement as well found MacDonald's belief in a 
strict division between the political and industrial wings of the Labour 
movement a welcome relief after the corrupting embrace of Lloyd 
George-although the Trades Union Congress (TUC) came to regret 
this division when they found MacDonald and Snowden more willing 
to listen to other party leaders than to trade unionists during the finan- 
cial crisis. 
A decade of Conservative dominance punctuated by minority La- 
bour governments thus succeeded in reestablishing "sound finance," 
"actuarially-sound" insurance, and the supremacy of party over inter- 
est-all precepts that the Coalition had violated-as premises (and not 
choices) of "responsible" government. It was this framework that was 
challenged by the political instability and economic crisis in the late 
twenties, and that Baldwin, Chamberlain, Samuel, MacDonald, Philip 
Snowden, and others-all old anti-coalitionists-ultimately combined 
to protect.39 Since they saw this framework as the basis both of their 
own political recovery and of "constitutional" government, the sug- 
gestion that the country was falling into a "national crisis" comparable 
in seriousness to the war raised the specter not only of Lloyd George 
but of a return to social unrest, "irresponsible" finance, and industrial 
intervention. These fears were illusory because the analogy between 
1931 and 1918 was false: after all, the National Government went off 
gold without any serious political consequences, and the trade union 
movement was far too battered to force any return to industrial concili- 
ation. Lloyd George himself seems to have recognized this: as William- 
son notes, while he was happy to pose as the "man of emergency" in 
1930, "as someone who had faced and surmounted genuine national 
and world crises, he had the experience to be sceptical and relaxed 
38 Here Lloyd George's unwillingness to see the general strike as a threat to "consti- 
tutional" government stands in sharp contrast to the views of Baldwin, John Simon, 
Jimmy Thomas, and Neville Chamberlain (all key National Government ministers), who 
saw the strike, in Chamberlain's words, as "constitutional Govt .... fighting for its life." 
For Chamberlain's views, see David Dilks, Neville Chamberlain, vol. 1, Pioneering and 
Reform (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), pp. 470-1, 478. 
39 Many of the key supporters of the National Government had reason to remember 
the wartime and postwar coalitions with hostility: Neville Chamberlain had been humili- 
ated by his spell as wartime minister for National Service; Baldwin had fought Lloyd 
George over the Coalition's spendthrift ways; Herbert Samuel and John Simon had 
followed Asquith into opposition; the latter two-along with MacDonald and Snow- 
den-had lost their seats in the Coupon election. 
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about the idea of 'crisis.'"40 Had the "national crisis" of 1931 truly 
come to resemble the national crisis of 1918, not only would language 
have changed but it is arguable that Baldwin and MacDonald would 
have gone the way of Asquith in 1916 and Chamberlain in 1940, the 
country demonstrably preferring such obvious rule breakers as Lloyd 
George and Churchill during times of real national emergency. 
Williamson shows how Baldwin and MacDonald were able to use 
the specter of "national crisis" to bring about a very different alliance 
from that desired by those "politicians with a nostalgic interest in 
coalition" who first called for a return to "national government.""41 
What he does not show is the degree to which this alliance was the 
culmination of a political realignment and a course of policy that dated 
not from 1926 but from the reaction against the Coalition in the early 
twenties. Given this legacy, it is unsurprising that the evocation of the 
war put party allegiances under strain, the Liberals deserting their 
leader and the Labour leader his followers to adhere to painfully con- 
structed definitions of responsible government. Liberals had always 
tended to repudiate Lloyd George's interventionism in private, and 
the decision of both the Samuelites and the Simonites to support the 
National Government merely made those preferences explicit;42 on the 
other hand, MacDonald's obsession with "constitutionality," accept- 
able when Labour's membership was in full flight from the sullying 
embrace of the wartime state, was less tolerable with the TUC under- 
going its own Keynesian transformation. The Commons configuration 
in the mid-thirties, in which a fiscally conservative National Govern- 
ment faced an opposition made up of a tiny Lloyd George group, a 
Labour Party more conscious of its ties to the trade union movement, 
and, occasionally, a few maverick "one-nation" Tories, was an accu- 
rate reflection of that policy polarization. 
IV 
John Turner and Philip Williamson's studies will probably become 
the classic accounts of the course of high politics during the two pe- 
riods they discuss. Both books serve as important correctives to the 
historiography of the seventies, reminding us that political outcomes 
cannot simply be read off policy failures or the changing relations of 
interests and classes. But only Turner recognizes fully the extent to 
40National Crisis, p. 155. 
41 Ibid., p. 154. 
42 David Dutton's recent biography of Sir John Simon and Bernard Wasserstein's 
exemplary life of Herbert Samuel stress that their subjects both found Lloyd George's 
unorthodox financial policies and maverick leadership incomprehensible and somewhat 
irresponsible. David Dutton, Simon: A Political Biography of Sir John Simon (London: 
Aurum, 1992), esp. pp. 75-110; Bernard Wasserstein, Herbert Samuel: A Political Life 
(Oxford: Clarendon, 1992), esp. pp. 312-34. 
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which politicians' actions were driven not only by their search for 
personal and party-political advantage but also by their efforts to con- 
tain a perceived challenge to stability brought on by the war. This 
effort did not end with the collapse of the Coalition in 1922, although 
it did take a very different form. Yet Williamson does not place his 
study of the "national crisis" of 1930-31 within the context of this 
effort. His account is, then, a compelling but partial one: it can explain 
how politicians manipulated the rules, as they were then, to their own 
advantage but declines to explain how these rules were constructed 
and hence to assess whether they were really in danger of breaking 
down. It helps us understand how well or badly politicians played their 
hand but is silent when asked what enabled them to treat politics as a 
game in the first place. We should read Williamson's book, then, with 
the memory of an earlier national crisis in mind, a crisis that was social 
and constitutional as well as financial and parliamentary and whose 
successful mastery made Baldwin and MacDonald's framework-and, 
equally, a form of history writing that takes this framework as given- 
possible. The ghost of Lloyd George, and not MacDonald, should be 
at our elbow: in many ways the author of this postwar settlement 
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